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Epistemic Luck
Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be
accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a
true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right
answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a
true belief via wishful thinking; for example, an optimist’s belief that it will not rain may luckily
turn out to be correct, despite forecasts for heavy rain all day. One can reason from false premises
to a belief that coincidentally happens to be true. One can accidentally arrive at a true belief
through invalid or fallacious reasoning. And one can fortuitously arrive at a true belief from
testimony that was intended to mislead but unwittingly reported the truth. In all of these cases, it is
just a matter of luck that the person has a true belief.
Until the twenty-first century, there was nearly universal agreement among epistemologists that
epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge. Call this view “the incompatibility thesis.” In light
of the incompatibility thesis, epistemic luck presents epistemologists with three distinct but related
challenges. The first is that of providing an accurate analysis of knowledge (in terms of individually
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for “S knows that p,” where ‘S’ represents the knower
and ‘p’ represents the proposition known). An adequate analysis of knowledge must succeed in
specifying conditions that rule out all instances of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck. The
second challenge is to resolve the skeptical paradox that the ubiquity of epistemic luck generates:
As will become clear in section 2c, epistemic luck is an all-pervasive phenomenon. Coupling this
fact with the incompatibility thesis entails that we have no propositional knowledge. The non-
skeptical epistemologist must somehow reconcile the strong intuition that epistemic luck is not
compatible with knowledge with the equally evident observation that it must be. The third
challenge concerns the special skeptical threat that epistemic luck seems to pose for more reflective
forms of knowledge, such as knowing that one knows. Each of these challenges will be explored in
the present article.
Table of Contents
1. Epistemic Luck and the Analysis of Knowledge
a. The Incompatibility Thesis
b. The Justified-True-Belief Analysis of Knowledge
c. The Gettier Problem
d. Purported Solutions to the Gettier Problem
i. No False Grounds
ii. No Essential False Grounds
iii. Defeasibility Approaches
iv. The Externalist Turn
v. The Causal Theory of Knowing
e. Controversial Cases
i. Beneficial Falsehoods
ii. Misleading Evidence One Does Not Possess
iii. Impact of These Cases
f. Where Things Stand
2. The Paradox of Epistemic Luck
a. The Knowledge Thesis
b. The Incompatibility Thesis (Again)
c. The Ubiquity Thesis
d. The Skeptical Challenge
e. Rejecting the Incompatibility Thesis
f. Knowledge-Destroying Epistemic Luck
i. Evidential vs. Veritic Luck
ii. Justification-Oriented Luck
iii. Modal Veritic Luck
g. Second-Wave Anti-Luck Epistemologies
i. Sensitivity
ii. Safety
h. Paradox Lost
3. Epistemic Luck and Knowing that One Knows
a. Internalism, Epistemic Luck, and the Problem of Knowing that One Knows
b. Epistemic Luck and Reflective Knowledge
4. Conclusion
5. References and Further Reading
1. Epistemic Luck and the Analysis of Knowledge
There is no settled agreement as to how best to characterize the accidentality or fortuitousness of
an epistemically lucky true belief. Some have attempted to cash out the accidentality of
epistemically lucky beliefs modally. For example, Mark Heller (1999) contends that person S’s
belief that p is epistemically lucky (and hence not knowledge) if p is true in the actual world, but
there is at least one world, in a contextually-determined set of possible worlds, where S’s belief that
p is false. On Duncan Pritchard’s modal characterization (2005), S’s belief is epistemically lucky if
it is true in the actual world, but false in a majority of nearby possible worlds where S forms the
belief in the same way. Others (Riggs 2007; Coffman 2007) insist that epistemic luck be cashed out
in terms of a lack of control condition. Each of these proposals has been criticized in the literature.
Despite the lack of agreement concerning the exact nature of epistemic luck, there is widespread
agreement that epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge.
One of the earliest recorded illustrations of knowledge-destroying luck can be found in Plato’s
Theaetetus. In this dialogue, Socrates inquires as to what knowledge is. When Theaetetus suggests
that knowledge is true belief, Socrates quickly convinces him that he is mistaken by noting that a
jury may luckily arrive at a true belief either as a result of the rhetorical skill of a jurist intent on
getting a certain verdict or on the basis of unsubstantiated hearsay, and in either case, the lucky
true belief would fall short of knowledge. The Socratic challenge posed in the Theaetetus is to
specify what must be added to true belief to get knowledge. To meet that challenge, one must
provide an analysis of knowledge that correctly identifies the conditions that are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for S to know that p (where ‘S’ represents the knower and ‘p’
represents the proposition known). As will become readily apparent in what follows, the possibility
of epistemic luck makes the already difficult task of meeting the Socratic challenge all the more
difficult.
a. The Incompatibility Thesis
Epistemologists have long agreed with Plato that epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge.
To see just how widespread commitment to the incompatibility thesis is, consider the remarks of
just few representative epistemologists. In The Problems of Philosophy (1912, p. 131), Bertrand
Russell asks the question: “Can we ever know anything at all, or do we merely sometimes by good
luck believe what is true?”—the implication being that lucky true belief is not knowledge. In Theory
of Knowledge (1990, p. 12), Keith Lehrer stresses that knowledge requires more than lucky true
acceptance: “If I accept something without evidence or justification . . . and, as luck would have it,
this turns out to be right, I fall short of knowing that what I have accepted is true.” In Reasons and
Knowledge (1981, p. 31), Marshall Swain maintains that: “lucky guesses do not constitute factual
knowledge.” In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the analysis of knowledge
(2006), Matthias Steup expressly endorses the incompatibility thesis: “Let us refer to a belief's
turning out to be true because of mere luck as epistemic luck. It is uncontroversial that knowledge
is incompatible with epistemic luck.” In his Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on
epistemology (2007), David Truncellito concurs: “a lucky guess cannot constitute knowledge.
Similarly, misinformation and faulty reasoning do not seem like a recipe for knowledge, even if
they happen to lead to a true belief.” In Epistemic Luck (2005, p. 1), Duncan Pritchard calls
attention to “the seemingly universal intuition that knowledge excludes luck, or, to put it another
way, that the epistemic luck that sometimes enables one to have true beliefs . . . is incompatible
with knowledge.”
The nearly universal intuition that epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge is rooted in
compelling examples like the following:
Jack of Hearts
Dylan is an avid euchre player. One night between hands, the dealer asks Dylan which card he
believes to be on the top of the freshly shuffled euchre deck. Dylan thinks for a moment and,
recalling his fondness of bowers, comes to believe that the top card is the jack of hearts. After
Dylan reports his belief, the dealer turns over the top card, which just so happens to be the jack
of hearts.
Since the probability of the jack of hearts being the top card of a randomly shuffled euchre deck is
1/32, it is just a matter of luck that Dylan’s belief was true. Dylan certainly didn’t know that the
jack of hearts was the top card. He just happened to guess correctly, and knowledge requires more
than lucky guesswork.
b. The Justified-True-Belief Analysis of Knowledge
Examples like Jack of Hearts clearly show that true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. What,
then, must be added to true belief in order to get knowledge? Prior to 1963, most epistemologists
maintained that justification is what is required to convert true belief to knowledge, and as a result,
they endorsed the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge:
(JTB)   For any subject S and any proposition p, S knows that p if and only if:
(i) p is true,
(ii) S believes that p [Bp], and
(iii) S is justified in believing that p [Jp].
Fallibilists and infallibilists disagree about the kind of justification required by (iii). Infallibilists
maintain that knowledge requires infallible justification. Infallible justification entails the truth of
the proposition for which it is justification. Fallibilists, on the other hand, endorse a weaker
justification requirement. They contend that the kind of justification requisite for knowledge need
only render probable, but need not entail, that for which it is justification.
At first blush, it might look as if infallible justification holds the key to eliminating epistemic luck
and is, thus, the kind of justification needed for knowledge. After all, if S believes that p on the
basis of infallible truth-entailing justification for p, it is impossible for S to be mistaken with
respect to p. Unfortunately, the legacy of infallibilism is nearly wholesale skepticism. The point can
be demonstrated as follows: Since our evidence for the non-cogito contingent empirical
propositions we believe never entails the truth of those propositions, it follows that if the kind of
justification required for knowledge is infallible truth-entailing justification, then we are never
justified in believing, and hence never know, that such propositions are true. An infallibilist
justification requirement would go a long way toward eliminating epistemic luck, but it would do
so at the cost of making empirical knowledge impossible—hardly an adequate non-skeptical
solution to the problem of epistemic luck.
Recognizing the skeptical implications of infallibilism, most contemporary epistemologists have
embraced fallibilism so that empirical knowledge remains at least in principle possible. Fallibilistic
justification is thought to rule out epistemic luck by making one’s belief extremely probable. When
one’s belief that p is extremely probable, it is not just a matter of luck that one’s belief is true.
Recall Jack of Hearts. Prior to the dealer’s turning over the top card, Dylan has no evidence as to
what the top card is. As such, it is extremely improbable that the top card is the jack of hearts.
Consider how Dylan’s epistemic situation changes after the dealer turns over the top card, and
Dylan sees the jack of hearts. Now Dylan has good perceptual evidence that the card is the jack of
hearts. Given his newly-acquired perceptual evidence, it is now extremely probable that the card is
the jack of hearts, and as a result, it is no longer just a matter of luck that his belief that it is the
jack of hearts is true. Granted, it is possible that a Cartesian evil demon could have caused Dylan to
hallucinate the jack of hearts right as the dealer flipped over some other card (which illustrates that
Dylan’s perceptual evidence doesn’t entail that the card is the jack of hearts), and so, his evidence
doesn’t eliminate all chance of error; but it does make the chance of error extremely low, and when
error is extremely improbable, it is not simply a matter of luck that one’s belief is true.
c. The Gettier Problem
Although the role of the justification condition in the JTB-analysis is to rule out lucky guesses as
instances of knowledge, it remains possible, given any fallibilistic account of justification, to have a
justified belief that is only luckily true, a fact that went largely unnoticed until the publication of
Edmund Gettier’s seminal article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1963). Therein, Gettier
provides two compelling counterexamples to the JTB-analysis of knowledge. He dubs these
examples “Case I” and “Case II.” Both cases involve a person who justifiably comes to believe a true
proposition by validly deducing it from a justified-but-false belief. Consider first Gettier’s Case II.
Case II: Smith has good evidence for believing that Jones owns a Ford [J]. Indeed, Smith’s
evidence for thinking that Jones owns a Ford is at least as strong as the evidence that we typically
have for thinking that our friends and family members own the cars they do. Smith’s evidence
consists of the following: As far back as Smith can remember, Jones has always owned a Ford; just
that morning, Jones gave Smith a ride while driving a Ford; and Smith was with Jones a few
months back when Jones purchased a Ford exactly like the one she was driving when she offered
Smith the ride earlier that morning. Based on this evidence, Smith justifiedly believes that Jones
owns a Ford [J]. On the basis of her justified belief that J, Smith justifiedly deduces and comes to
believe the disjunction that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona [J or B], despite
having no idea of Brown’s whereabouts. As it turns out, Jones no longer owns a Ford. She recently
sold her Ford and is driving a rental. However, purely by coincidence, Brown happens to be in
Barcelona. Obviously, it is just a matter of luck that Smith’s justified belief that J or B is true.
Nearly every epistemologist who has considered this case agrees that Smith’s luck-infused
justified-true-belief that J or B falls short of knowledge.
Here is a slightly modified version Gettier’s other example. Case I: While waiting for a job
interview, Smith sees Nelson take the coins out of her pocket, count them (ten coins in all), and
then put them back in her pocket. Smith also overhears the boss on the phone telling someone that
Nelson is the person who will get the job. On the basis of this evidence, Smith justifiedly believes
the conjunction:
(N)  Nelson will get the job, and Nelson has ten coins in her pocket.
On basis of her justified belief that N, Smith deduces and justifiedly comes to believe:
(P)  The person who will get the job has ten coins in her pocket.
Despite Smith’s evidence, N is false. The boss misspoke on the phone. Actually, it is Smith, not
Nelson, who will get the job, and purely by chance, Smith happens to have exactly ten coins in her
pocket. Once again, it is just a matter of luck that Smith’s belief—this time her belief that P—is true.
With these two examples, Gettier showed that fallibilistic justification is incapable of eliminating
all forms of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck and that, as a result, justified true belief is not
sufficient for knowledge.
d. Purported Solutions to the Gettier Problem
Gettier’s paper gave rise to a plethora of articles attempting to solve the problem that now bears his
name. Many of these purported solutions sought to resolve the problem by supplementing the JTB-
analysis with a fourth condition, while others abandoned the JTB-analysis in favor of non-
traditional ajustificational accounts of knowledge. Consider first some of the prominent fourth
condition responses.
i. No False Grounds
In both of Gettier’s examples, Smith justifiably infers a true belief from a justified-but-false belief,
and it has seemed to many that a true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief.
As a result, a number of epistemologists sought to resolve the Gettier problem by supplementing
JTB with a “No False Grounds” clause along the following lines:
(NFG) S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, (iii) S is justified in
believing that p, and (iv) S’s justification for p does not rest on any false beliefs.
An analysis of knowledge can be too strong or too weak: It is too strong if it is possible for a person
to know that p without satisfying all of the conditions spelled out in the analysis. It is too weak if
one can fail to know that p when all the conditions in the analysis have been met. To see that NFG
is too strong, we need only modify Gettier’s Case II as follows:
Café
Smith is sitting in a café in Barcelona with Brown having a cup of espresso. While there, with
Brown, Smith justifiably infers and comes to believe that J or B on the basis of her justified-
but-false belief that Jones owns a Ford [J] and on the basis of her justified-true-belief that
Brown is Barcelona [B].
In this scenario, Smith has excellent evidence for B along with her misleading evidence for J. Since
Smith knows B is true and validly deduces J or B from her knowledge that B, it is not at all lucky
that her justified belief that J or B is true; and so, Smith knows that J or B, despite the fact that
part of her evidence, namely, J, is false. Hence, NFG is false, for it entails that a person fails to
know that p whenever any part (even a dispensable and thus superfluous part) of her justification
is false, when, intuitively, a person with some false evidence for p can still know that p provided she
has at least one independent chain of all-true-evidence justification for p.
ii. No Essential False Grounds
In Gettier’s Case II (where Smith clearly fails to know that J or B), Smith’s justification for J or B
essentially depends on Smith’s justified-but-false belief that J. In Café (where intuitively Smith
does know that J or B), Smith has two independent strands of justification for J or B. The first
strand is her justified-but-false belief that J. The second strand is her justified-true-belief that B.
As a result, Smith could dispense with the first strand entirely and still be justified in believing the
disjunction J or B. Our markedly different appraisals of Smith’s epistemic status vis-à-vis J or B in
these two cases suggest that the presence of false grounds precludes the knowledge that p only
when those grounds play an indispensable role in a person’s justification for p. Given this insight, it
might seem that the no false grounds condition in NFG should be replaced with a no essential false
grounds condition as follows:
(NEFG)  S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, (iii) S is justified in
believing that p, and (iv) S’s justification for p does not essentially depend on any false beliefs.
Unfortunately, NEFG is too weak because there can be all-true-evidence Gettier cases—cases
where the person’s justification for her lucky true belief does not depend on any false beliefs. An
example of an all-true-evidence Gettier case is provided by Brian Skyrms’s (1967) case involving
Sure-Fire matches:
Pyromaniac
Pete knows that Sure-Fire matches have always lit in the past when struck. Pete also knows
that the match he is holding is a Sure-Fire match. Based on this evidence, which he knows to
be true, Pete justifiably believes that the match he is holding will light when struck [L].
Unbeknownst to Pete, the match he is holding is a defective Sure-Fire match (the first ever!)
with impurities that raise its combustion temperature above that which can be produced by
striking friction. As luck would have it, just as Pete strikes the match, a sudden burst of Q-
radiation ignites the match.
In Pyromaniac, Pete has a justified true belief that L, which is based entirely on true evidence that
Pete knows, and yet, it is still just a matter of luck that his belief is true. This example shows that
one can have a lucky true belief that p that falls short of knowledge, even when all of one’s evidence
for p is true. Thus, NEFG is too weak. There are genuine Gettier cases that it fails to rule out.
iii. Defeasibility Approaches
In each of Gettier’s original cases, there is a true proposition unbeknownst to Smith such that were
that proposition added to the rest of Smith’s evidence, Smith would no longer be justified in
believing the Gettiered belief. Call such a proposition a defeater. In Case I, the defeater is the true
proposition that Nelson will not get the job [~N]. If ~N were added to Smith’s evidence, Smith
would not be justified in believing that the person who will get the job has ten coins in her pocket,
for she would no longer have any idea who will get the job. In Case II, the defeater is the true
proposition that Jones does not own a Ford [~J]. Since Smith has no knowledge as to Brown’s
whereabouts, if ~J were added to Smith’s evidence, she would no longer be justified in believing
that J or B. Notice, however, that in the case of Café (where Smith is with Brown in Barcelona), the
true proposition ~J is not a defeater, because adding ~J to Smith’s evidence in Café would not
prevent Smith from being justified in believing that J or B. Smith would still be justified in
believing J or B on the basis of her justified true belief that B.
Defeasibility theorists contend that a person fails to know that p whenever there is a defeater for
her justification for p. Their proposal for solving the Gettier problem is to supplement the JTB-
analysis with a No Defeaters condition as follows:
(ND)    S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, (iii) S is justified in
believing that p, and (iv) there are no defeaters for S’s justification for p.
The biggest problem facing the No Defeaters approach is that there is no agreement among
defeasibility theorists themselves as to the correct account of defeaters. For example, Roderick
Chisholm (1964) and Peter Klein (1971) have characterized defeaters as follows:
(D1)     When evidence e justifies S in believing that p, then proposition d is a defeater for S’s
justification if and only if (i) d is true and (ii) the conjunction of d and e does not justify S in
believing that p.
Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson Jr. (1969) contend that D1 is too weak, as a definition of
defeaters, because it counts as defeaters certain statements that intuitively are not defeaters. They
offer the following case in point:
Grabit
While at the library, I see a student of mine, Tom Grabit, take a book from the shelf, conceal it
under his coat, and leave the library without checking it out. I know Tom Grabit well, and I am
sure that he stole the book. I justifiedly believe that Tom Grabit stole the book, and he did.
Intuitively, I know that Tom Grabit stole the book. But here’s the rub: Unbeknownst to me, Tom
Grabit’s mother said that on the day in question Tom was not in the library, indeed, he was
thousands of miles away, and that Tom’s identical twin, John Grabit, was in the library. On the D1
account of defeaters, the following true proposition is a defeater for my justification for thinking
that Tom stole the book:
(M) Tom’s mother said that Tom was not in the library at the time of the theft, but his identical
twin John was.
If M were added to my evidence, I would no longer be justified in believing that Tom stole the
book. This result might seem like the right result until we discover that Tom’s mother is both
delusional and a pathological liar, that she said these things to herself in her padded cell, that John
Grabit is a figment of her demented mind, and that Tom stole the book just as I thought. Lehrer
and Paxson argue that the fact that it is true that a delusional mental patient uttered false
statements about Tom Grabit’s location on the day of the theft should not defeat my knowledge
that Tom Stole the book. They conclude that the Chisholm/Klein account of defeaters should be
replaced with the follow account:
(D2)     When evidence e justifies S in believing that p, then proposition d is a defeater for S’s
justification if and only if (i) d is true, (ii) S is completely justified in believing that d is false,
and (iii) the conjunction of d and e does not justify S in believing that p.
In Grabit, I do not have any evidence concerning what Tom’s mother said or didn’t say, and so, I
am not completely justified in believing that it is false that she said those things. As a result,
condition (ii) of D2 is not satisfied, and so, on the Lehrer/Paxson account of defeaters that fact that
Ms. Grabit said those things is not a defeater for my evidence that Tom stole the book.
Consequently, on the D2-account of defeaters, I have an undefeated justified true belief that Tom
stole the book and thus know that Tom stole the book, which is the intuitively correct result.
The Chisholm/Klein D1-account of defeaters gets the Grabit case wrong, for it entails that the true
statement M defeats my justification for thinking that Tom stole the book. Since M is a defeater on
the Chisholm/Klein account, their account entails that I do not know that Tom stole the book;
when, intuitively, I do know that Tom stole the book. I saw him steal it, and the insane ramblings
of his demented mother do nothing to undermine my knowledge.
Now consider a different case:
Locked
John Lock is compulsive when it comes to locking his doors. This morning when he left for
work, he locked the front door and tripled checked that the door was locked. It is now 11:00
a.m., and John is sitting in his office recalling his morning ritual. He clearly and distinctly
remembers locking his front door and triple checking to make sure that it was in fact locked.
On the basis of this vivid memorial evidence e, he comes to believe that his front door is
locked. Lucy Lock, John’s wife, is notoriously unreliable about locking the doors when she
leaves home, which is why John always insists on leaving home after Lucy leaves for work.
Unbeknownst to John, Lucy forgot her workout clothes and returned home at 10:30 a.m. to
retrieve them, and she just happened to lock the door when she left five minutes later.
So, at 11:00 a.m., John’s belief that the front door is locked is true. Presumably, John does not
know that the front door is locked. He thinks the door is locked because he remembers locking it,
but that is not why it is locked. It is locked because Lucy absentmindedly and uncharacteristically
happened to lock it on her way out. Intuitively, John’s knowledge is defeated by the following true
proposition:
(U) The door was unlocked by Lucy at 10:30 a.m.
If U were added to John’s memorial evidence e, John would no longer be justified in believing that
his front door is locked. On the Chisholm/Klein D1-account of defeaters, U is a defeater because U
is true and the conjunction of U and e would not justify John in believing that his front door is
locked. However, on the Lehrer/Paxson D2-account of defeaters, U would not count as a defeater
because sitting in his office at 11:00 a.m., John has no evidence concerning whether or not his wife
returned home to retrieve her gym clothes, and so, he is not completely justified in believing it false
that the door was unlocked by Lucy Lock at 10:30 a.m. Since U is not a defeater on the
Lehrer/Paxson account, their account entails that John knows that his front door is locked; when,
intuitively, he fails to know that his door is locked, because it is just a matter of luck that Lucy
absentmindedly locked it when she left.
The problem for the No Defeaters approach, then, is this: D1 is too weak of an account of defeaters,
and as a result, employing a D1-account of defeaters in ND would make ND too strong an account
of knowledge; whereas D2 is too strong an account of defeaters, and so, employing it in ND would
make ND too weak. Absent an adequate account of defeaters, the No Defeaters approach fails to
provide a solution to the problem of epistemic luck.
iv. The Externalist Turn
Externalist theories of justification maintain that epistemic justification is (at least) partly a
function of features external to the cognizer, that is, features outside the cognizer’s ken. For
example, one prominent externalist theory, process reliabilism, makes a belief’s justificatory status
a function of the actual reliability (rather than the perceived reliability) of the process producing
that belief. One motivation behind externalism with respect to justification is its unique ability to
provide a truth connection that conceptually links justification with truth. To appreciate the
importance of this motivation, recall that the role of the justification condition in the JTB-analysis
is to rule out lucky guesses as instances of knowledge. In order for justification to be able to
properly play that role, there must be some sort of internal connection between justification and
truth that makes the former objectively indicative of the latter. Indeed, many epistemologists insist
that it is precisely its internal connection to truth that distinguishes epistemic justification from
moral and pragmatic justification. To be objectively indicative of truth, justification must be
conceptually connected (not merely coincidentally or contingently connected) with truth. In order
for there to be a conceptual connection between justification and truth, the following condition
must hold: In every possible world W, if conditions C make belief b justified in W, then conditions
C also make b objectively probable in W. The rationale for requiring such a truth connection is this:
If there were no conceptual connection between justification and truth, it would be just as much a
matter of luck when a justified belief turned out to be true as when an unjustified belief turned out
to be true. Moreover, a better justified belief would be no more likely to be true than a much less
well justified belief, for without a truth connection, no amount of justification is an objective
indication of truth.
Unlike externalist theories of justification, no internalist theory of justification can provide the
desired conceptual connection between justification and truth. Internalist theories maintain that
epistemic justification is solely a function of states internal to the cognizer, such as perceptual
states, belief states, memorial seemings, and introspective states. Examples of such theories
include classical foundationalism, coherentism, and evidentialism. That no internalist theory of
justification can provide a truth connection can be demonstrated as follows: Every internalist
theory of justification maintains that the conditions that make a belief justified are entirely
specifiable in terms of states internal to the cognizer, and for any set of entirely internally
specifiable justification-conferring conditions, C , there will always be a possible world, W , where
a Cartesian evil demon has seen to it that S possesses the requisite internal states and, hence,
satisfies C , even though all of S’s contingent empirical beliefs are false. Since the conditions C  that
make S’s belief b internalistically justified in W  do not make b objectively probable in W , no
internalist theory is capable of providing a truth connection. Because internalistic justification is
not conceptually connected to truth, one can easily be internalistically justified in holding a false
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belief, which can in turn be used to justifiably infer some other belief that may coincidentally turn
out to be true. Consequently, employing an internalistic justification condition in the JTB-analysis
makes JTB particularly susceptible to Gettier cases.
At first glance, externalistic justification looks more promising as a means of preventing luck from
playing a role in the acquisition of true belief, for some externalist theories of justification do
provide a conceptual connection between justification and truth. Consider, for example, the
following simplified version of process reliabilism:
(PR)     S’s belief b is justified in world W if and only if S’s belief b is produced by a belief-
forming cognitive process [BCP] that is W-reliable (where a W​-reliable BCP is a process that
tends to produce beliefs in W that are true in W).
Since PR asserts that a belief is justified in W if and only if it is produced by a W-reliable BCP, and
since, by definition, the beliefs produced by a W-reliable process tend to be true in W, PR-justified
beliefs have a high objective probability of being true. Because reliably-produced, externalistically-
justified beliefs are objectively likely to be true, one might think that replacing the internalistic
justification condition in the traditional JTB-analysis with an externalistic justification condition
would render JTB immune to Gettier-style counterexamples. William Harper (1996) quickly
dispels any such notion, with the following counterexample:
Falcon
Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford. Smith was with Jones when Jones purchased her
Pinto; Smith has seen the official title to the car in Jones’s name; Jones is a reliable informant
that has never deceived anyone; and just this morning, Jones gave Smith a ride to work in her
Pinto. Smith has a reliably-produced and reliably-sustained belief that Jones owns a Ford. It is
now 1:00 p.m. Unbeknownst to Smith, at noon Jones’s Pinto was vaporized by a terrorist
bomb; but, also unbeknownst to Smith, exactly at noon Jones won a Ford Falcon in the State
Lottery. Hence, Smith has a reliably-formed true belief that Jones owns a Ford, but her belief
is not knowledge.
While internalistic justification may be particularly susceptible to being undermined by Gettier-
style knowledge-destroying luck, Harper’s counterexample shows that the Gettier problem plagues
all fallibilistic theories of justification, both internalistic and externalistic alike. Whatever virtues
externalistic justification might have, solving the Gettier problem is not among them.
v. The Causal Theory of Knowing
In his early work, Alvin Goldman (1967) offers a different diagnosis of what has gone wrong in
Gettier cases. In Case II, what makes J or B true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact
plays no causal role in Smith’s coming to believe that J or B. In Case I, what makes P (P = the
person who will get the job has ten coins in her pocket) true is the number of coins in Smith’s
pocket, but this fact plays no role in Smith’s coming to believe P. What causes Smith to believe P is
the fact that Nelson has ten coins in her pocket, and this latter fact is not what makes P true.
Goldman observes that in these cases there is no causal connection between the Gettiered belief
and the fact that makes it true. It is the absence of such a connection that allows for the possibility
of belief’s being true purely by luck. Goldman concludes that the traditional JTB-analysis should be
replaced with the following causal theory of knowledge:
(CTOK)  S knows that p if and only if the fact that p is causally connected in an appropriate
way with S’s believing that p.
The appropriate knowledge-producing causal processes that Goldman identifies include: (i)
perception, (ii) memory, (iii) inferentially reconstructed causal chains, each inference of which is
warranted, and (iv) combinations of (i)-(iii). The causal theory correctly handles all of the cases we
have considered so far. We have already seen how it handles Gettier’s original cases. In Café, what
makes J or B true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, and that fact is appropriately causally
connected with Smith’s believing that J or B, because Smith is having an espresso with Brown in
Barcelona. Accordingly, CTOK correctly entails that, in Café, Smith knows that J or B. In Grabit, I
see Tom steal the book. Tom’s stealing the book in plain eyesight perceptually causes me to believe
that he did, and so, once again, CTOK yields the right result: I know that Tom Grabit stole the
book. In Locked, what makes it true that the front door is locked is the fact that Lucy locked it, and
this fact plays no causal role in John’s believing his front door is locked. In this case, CTOK
correctly entails that John does not know that his front door is locked. He’s just lucky that Lucy
happened to lock it. Finally, in Falcon, what makes it true that Jones owns a Ford is the fact that
she just won a Ford Falcon in the state lottery, and that fact plays no causal role in Smith’s
believing that Jones owns a Ford, and so, Smith fails to know that Jones owns a Ford.
Despite its success in handling these cases, the causal theory falls prey to the following
counterexample:
Fake Barn County
An eccentric farmer in Minnesota owns all of the land in Fake Barn County. Wanting to appear
much richer than he is, this farmer has erected fake barns all throughout the county. From the
road, these fake barns look exactly like real barns, when, in reality, they are just two
dimensional barn façades. While nearly every barn-looking structure in the county is a fake,
there are a few real barns interspersed among the myriad fakes. Henry, who is driving through
Fake Barn County, has no idea that there are any fake barns in the county. Looking out the
window of his car, Henry sees what looks to be a barn on the hill just up the road and comes to
believe that there is a barn on the hill. Purely by chance, Henry happens to be looking at one of
the few real barns in the county.
Intuitively, Henry does not know that there is a barn on the hill. He is just lucky to be looking at
one of the few real barns in the county. The lucky nature of his present belief becomes even more
obvious once we discover that Henry has been forming barn beliefs ever since entering Fake Barn
County, and all of these other barn beliefs have been false. Henry has consistently been duped by
the façades.
The causal theory fails because it cannot account for Henry’s lack of knowledge in this case. Henry
is now looking at one of the few real barns in the county, and this real barn is what is causing him
to believe that there is a barn on the hill. Since Henry’s true belief that there is a barn on that hill is
appropriately caused via perception by that very barn on that hill, the causal theory mistakenly
entails that Henry knows there is a barn on that hill, when clearly he does not.
e. Controversial Cases
As analyses of knowledge aimed as at solving the Gettier problem have grown in sophistication and
complexity, so have the purported counterexamples aimed at refuting these analyses. Some of
these purported counterexamples are sufficiently complex and controversial that there is no
consensus among epistemologists as to whether or not the person in the example knows the
proposition in question. Two such cases are discussed below.
i. Beneficial Falsehoods
Although the no essential false grounds approach was largely abandoned once it was shown that
there can be all-true-evidence Gettier cases—cases where S’s justification for her lucky belief p
does not depend on any false beliefs—there has remained nearly universal agreement among
epistemologists that a person fails to know that p if her justification for p essentially depends on a
false belief. Peter Klein (2008) is a noteworthy exception. He contends that there can be beneficial
falsehoods—falsehoods essential to one’s justification that nevertheless give one knowledge. Here
is one example that Klein offers in support of his controversial view:
Appointment
Based on memory, I believe that my secretary told me on Friday that I have an appointment
with a student on Monday. Based on that justified-but-false memorial belief, I come to
justifiedly believe that I have an appointment on Monday. As it turns out, I do have that
appointment on Monday, and my secretary did tell me of the appointment. However, he didn’t
tell me on Friday. He told me on Thursday.
Klein contends that I know that I have an appointment on Monday [A], even though my belief that
A essentially depends on my false belief that my secretary told me on Friday about my Monday
appointment. It might seem that the false belief that my secretary told me on Friday that I have a
Monday appointment is not essential to my justification for A, because if I “remember” that my
secretary told me on Friday of my Monday appointment, then presumably I also actually
remember that my secretary told me I have an appointment on Monday, and this latter belief is
true. But suppose that the secretary was out with the flu the first three days of the week, and also
suppose that I do not remember being on campus on Thursday. In fact, I’m confident that I wasn’t
on campus on Thursday, having totally forgotten that I briefly stopped in on Thursday to get my
mail. Klein contends that in such a situation I would not believe that my secretary told me of the
appointment at all, unless I believed that he told me this on Friday. Klein contends that I know
that A, even though that belief essentially depends on my false belief that my secretary told me on
Friday about my Monday appointment.
What distinguishes beneficial falsehoods from knowledge-destroying falsehoods? Under what
circumstances does a false belief f allow S to acquire knowledge that p? Klein’s answers to these
questions are rooted in and flow out of his preferred theory of knowledge. Klein contends that
knowledge requires both propositional and doxastic justification. Proposition p is propositionally
justified for S if and only if S has an epistemically adequate basis for p. S’s belief that p is
doxastically justified for S if and only if S’s belief that p has an appropriate causal basis. The basic
idea is that in order for S to know that p, S’s belief that p must be epistemically justified and
appropriately caused. Armed with the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification,
Klein argues that a false belief f is a beneficial falsehood just in case the following seven conditions
are met: (i) f is false, (ii) S’s belief that f is doxastically justified (that is, S’s belief that f has an
appropriate causal pedigree), (iii) the belief that f is essential in the causal production of the belief
that p, (iv) f propositionally justifies p, (v) f entails a true proposition t, (vi) t propositionally
justifies p, and (vii) whatever doxastically justifies S in believing that f also propositionally justifies
t for S. When these conditions are met, Klein contends that the false belief f is “close enough to the
truth” to give one knowledge that p. Applied to the case at hand, F is the false proposition that my
secretary told me on Friday that I have an appointment on Monday, and T is the true proposition
that my secretary told me that I have an appointment on Monday. Klein contends that my belief
that F meets all the conditions for being a beneficial falsehood: (i) F is false, (ii) my belief that F is
doxastically justified (appropriately caused) by the fact that he did tell me, (iii) my belief that F is
essential to my believing that A (for if I didn’t believe F, I would not believe he had told me about
an appointment at all and so I would not believe A), (iv) F propositionally justifies A, (v) F entails
the true proposition T, (vi) T propositionally justifies A, and (vii) the fact that my secretary told me
on Thursday about my Monday appointment propositionally justifies T for me.
Klein contends that, in the case at hand, it doesn’t really matter what day my secretary told me that
I have an appointment on Monday. What matters is the fact that he told me. The false belief that he
told me on Friday is close enough to the true proposition that he told me as to give me knowledge
that I have an appointment on Monday.
While interesting and provocative, Klein’s case is difficult to assess because it depends on
controversial assumptions about belief individuation. Is it possible, for example, to believe that my
secretary told me on Friday that I have an appointment on Monday [F], without also believing that
my secretary told me that I have an appointment on Monday [T]? If not, then rather than providing
us with a case of an indispensable knowledge-generating false belief, Klein may have simply given
us another case of justificatory over-determination; for if it is impossible to believe F without also
believing T, then there seem to be two independent strands of justification only one of which
depends on a false belief, in which case Appointment is simply an analogue of Café above.
ii. Misleading Evidence One Does Not Possess
Gilbert Harman (1973) contends that S’s knowledge that p can be undermined by readily available
misleading evidence that S does not possess. In Harman cases, despite the fact that the
undermining evidence is misleading, if S were to possess it, S would no longer be justified in
believing that p. The idea behind Harman cases seems to be this: Since the misleading evidence is
readily available, it is just a matter of luck that S does not possess that evidence, and since luck is
incompatible with knowledge, S fails to know that p. Here is one of Harman’s cases:
Assassination
A political leader is assassinated. His associates, fearing a coup, decide to pretend that the
bullet hit someone else. On Nationwide television they announce that an assassination attempt
has failed to kill the leader but has killed a secret service man by mistake. However, before the
announcement is made, an enterprising reporter on the scene telephones the real story to his
newspaper, which has included the story in its final edition. Jill buys a copy of that paper,
reads the story of the assassination, and believes that the President has been assassinated
based on the story. What she reads is true, and so are her assumptions about how the story
came to be in the paper. (1973, 143)
Harman insists that Jill does not know that the President has been assassinated. He finds it highly
implausible that Jill should know simply because she lacks evidence that everyone else possesses.
Harman’s diagnosis is that Jill’s knowledge is undermined by readily available evidence – the
misleading televised retraction – that she does not possess.
Epistemologists who have reflected on Harman’s Assassination case remain divided over whether
or not Jill knows that the President has been assassinated. Those who think that she does know
that the President has been assassinated tend to focus on the facts that (i) all of her evidence is
true, (ii) she knows her evidence is true, and (iii) the evidence she has is an accurate indicator of
the President’s assassination.
Those epistemologists who think that Jill does not know that the President has been assassinated
do not focus on the quality of Jill’s evidence, which is impeccable. Rather, they focus on the lucky
nature of her evidence. If Jill had turned on the TV when she got home, like she usually does, she
would have seen the televised retraction, and she would have found herself in the same epistemic
predicament as everyone else. Given the conflicting reports, she would not have known what to
believe. Clearly, Jill is lucky to be in the evidential situation she is in. Since luck is generally
thought to be incompatible with knowledge, these epistemologists conclude that Jill fails to know
that the President has been assassinated.
iii. Impact of These Cases
Controversial cases like these make the challenge of providing an accurate analysis of knowledge
even more difficult. If Jill does know that the President has been assassinated, then all those
theories of knowledge that imply that she lacks such knowledge (including Harman’s own theory)
are mistaken. On the other hand, if Jill does not know that the President has been assassinated,
then all those theories that imply she does are mistaken. Similarly, if I do not know that I have an
appointment on Monday, then all those theories that imply I do (including Klein’s theory) are
mistaken. If I do know that I have an appointment on Monday, then all those theories that imply I
lack such knowledge are mistaken. The competing intuitions these cases engender make the
already difficult task of arriving at a mutually agreed upon account of knowledge even more
formidable.
f. Where Things Stand
While various proponents of the above proposals might still embrace them, the general consensus
is that none of the above attempts at eliminating epistemic luck succeeds. One problem with these
first attempts at resolving the Gettier problem is that they tended to emerge in a piecemeal fashion
as responses to specific counterexamples, only to fall prey to more elaborate counterexamples
themselves. What seems to be needed is a better understanding of epistemic luck itself. If we can
get clear on the exact nature of knowledge-destroying luck, we might be in a better position to
formulate a condition that can eliminate it. The next section will examine a number of attempts at
clarifying the nature of knowledge-destroying luck and will assess several modal conditions that
have been proposed to eliminate such luck.
2. The Paradox of Epistemic Luck
In addition to generating problems for those epistemologists seeking an analysis of knowledge, the
phenomenon of epistemic luck gives rise to an epistemological paradox in its own right. The
paradox is generated by the following three theses: the knowledge thesis, the incompatibility
thesis, and the ubiquity thesis. The paradox arises because each of these theses is antecedently
plausible, but together they form an inconsistent triad. Each thesis is discussed below.
a. The Knowledge Thesis
According to the knowledge thesis, we possess a great deal of knowledge about the world around
us. Commonsense tells us that the knowledge thesis is true. For example, I know that I am in a
coffee shop. I know that I am drinking a cup of coffee. I know that I am wearing a blue shirt. I know
that I am typing on a laptop computer. And I know that the person sitting next to me is talking on
his cell phone at an inappropriate volume. You know that you have eyes. You know that you are
reading an IEP article on epistemic luck. You know that the article you are reading is written in
English. Together, we know a lot. At least, we think we do, until we encounter a skeptical paradox
like the paradox of epistemic luck.
b. The Incompatibility Thesis (Again)
The incompatibility thesis is the thesis that epistemic luck simpliciter is incompatible with
knowledge. As noted above, there has been nearly universal agreement among epistemologists that
knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck. The post-Gettier literature is replete with
evermore-sophisticated counterexamples to the array of purported accounts of knowledge
proffered in an effort to resolve the Gettier problem. The standard formula for generating a
counterexample to a purported analysis of knowledge is to conjure up a case where, despite
satisfying all the conditions in the analysis, it is still just a matter of luck that the person’s belief
that p is true. The element of luck involved is ipso facto thought to prevent the belief from being an
instance of knowledge. The nearly unanimous acceptance of such examples illustrates just how
widespread commitment to the incompatibility thesis is.
c. The Ubiquity Thesis
Epistemic luck is an all-pervasive phenomenon that infects every fallibilistic epistemology in one
form or other. Its inescapability can be demonstrated as follows: To convert true belief to
knowledge, every viable fallibilistic epistemology requires satisfying either some internalistic
justification condition or some externalistic condition (that may or may not be a justification
condition). But neither an internalistic nor an externalistic condition can completely succeed in
eliminating epistemic luck. A little recognized consequence of the new evil demon problem is that
internalistic justification is not conceptually connected to truth in any robust way, for demon-
world victims have internalistically justified beliefs almost all of which are false. Given the absence
of a robust truth connection, it is always in some sense a matter of luck when a merely
internalistically justified belief turns out to be true. To see why, consider my twin in an evil demon
world W . By hypothesis, he has the same beliefs that I have, he has the same memorial seemings
that I have, he possesses the same experiential evidence that I possess, and he goes through exactly
the same internal reflections that I do. In short, our internal cognitive lives are
phenomenologically, doxastically, and reflectively indistinguishable. Consequently, if I satisfy the
internal conditions for justifiedness (whatever they may be), then my demon-world twin satisfies
them as well, and so, we are both internalistically justified in our beliefs. If, on the other hand, I fail
to satisfy those conditions, then my twin also fails to satisfy them, and so neither of us is
internalistically justified in our beliefs. Now assume the former scenario where both of us are
internalistically justified in our beliefs. The only relevant difference between my twin and me is
that he is being systematically deceived, whereas, as epistemic good fortune would have it, I am
not. If he and I were to change places, there would be no introspectable difference, and each of us
would continue to believe as we do, only now I would be the hapless victim of demon deception.
Clearly, I am epistemically fortunate to be in the world I am in (assuming I am in the world I take
myself to be in) and not in W . Since I am lucky to be in the world I am in, there is a clear sense in
which it is epistemically lucky that my internalistically justified beliefs are true. My twin is not
nearly so lucky, for, thanks to the demon, all of his internalistically justified beliefs are false. Since
these results can be generated no matter which internalistic theory of justification one employs, it
is always a matter of luck when a merely internalistically justified belief happens to be true.
Truth-connected externalist approaches (for example, reliabilist, truth-tracking, and safety-based
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accounts) avoid this kind of epistemic luck. However, they are subject to another kind of
ineliminable epistemic luck. Recall, from section 1, the externalistic process-reliabilist account of
epistemic justification:
(PR)     S’s belief b is justified in world W if and only if S’s belief b is produced by a belief-
forming cognitive process that is W-reliable.
Call a belief that is justified in virtue of being reliably produced a PR-justified belief. Although it is
not typically a matter of luck when a PR-justified belief turns out to be true (since PR-justification
is conceptually connected to truth), it is a matter of luck when a belief turns out to be PR-justified.
To see why, consider, once again, my twin in the demon world W . By hypothesis, he and I share
the same beliefs, possess the same evidence, go through the same internal reflections, and have
phenomenologically, doxastically, and reflectively indistinguishable cognitive lives. Even so, our
beliefs do not have the same PR-justificatory status. His beliefs are not PR-justified, because they
are produced by processes that the demon has rendered unreliable in W , whereas my beliefs are
PR-justified because they are produced by processes that are reliable in the actual world (Again,
I’m assuming, for the sake of the example, that the actual world is the world we think it is.).
According to PR, it is not a matter of luck that my beliefs are true and his beliefs are false, because
my beliefs are PR-justified and his are not, and PR-justified beliefs have a high objective
probability of being true. What is a matter of luck is the fact that my beliefs are PR-justified and his
are not. After all, we both take ourselves to be in non-demon-manipulated worlds, and we both
take ourselves to have reliably-produced PR-justified beliefs. As luck and ill luck, respectively,
would have it, I am correct and he is incorrect. Since there is no introspectively discernible
difference between our worlds, given what each of us has to go on, there is a clear sense in which I
could have just as easily been mistaken and been the one with demon-rendered-unreliable
processes. Compared to my twin, I am epistemically fortunate to be in a non-demon world where
my cognitive faculties are reliable. Since I am epistemically lucky (compared with my twin) to be in
a world where I have reliable cognitive processes, there is clearly a sense in which it is just a matter
of luck that I have PR-justified beliefs.
Analogous considerations can be applied to any externalistic constraint on knowledge. Consider
the externalistic condition of being a safe belief (to be explained below). While a safe belief’s being
true is not epistemically lucky, having safe beliefs is epistemically lucky, for in a demon world none
of one’s beliefs are safe. Since every fallibilistic epistemology incorporates either an internalistic
justification condition or an externalistic condition, no fallibilistic epistemology can rid us of
epistemic luck’s intractable presence.
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d. The Skeptical Challenge
Epistemic luck, then, is ubiquitous and unavoidable. If all forms of epistemic luck are incompatible
with knowledge, as the incompatibility thesis maintains, skepticism is correct and the knowledge
thesis is false. And yet, we remain convinced that we possess lots of knowledge. The task facing the
anti-skeptical epistemologist is to reconcile the rather strong intuition that epistemic luck is not
compatible with knowledge with the equally evident observation that it must be. Since the ubiquity
thesis is unassailable, the anti-skeptical epistemologist must reject the incompatibility thesis.
e. Rejecting the Incompatibility Thesis
Peter Unger (1968) was the first epistemologist to note that not all forms of epistemic luck are
incompatible with knowledge. He identified the following three types of benign epistemic luck: (1)
Propositional luck: It can be entirely accidental that p is true, and S can still know that p. For
example, a person who witnesses an automobile accident can certainly know that the accident
occurred. (2) Existential luck: For S to know that p, S must exist, and it might be extraordinarily
lucky that S exists. If S is the lone survivor of a fiery plane crash, S is lucky to be alive, but S’s
existential luck does not preclude her from knowing that she survived the crash. (3) Facultative
luck: To know that p, S must possess the cognitive skills requisite for knowledge. Suppose S is shot
in the head but the bullet narrowly misses all vital regions of the brain required for conceptual
thought and knowledge. S is overwhelmingly lucky that she still possesses the cognitive capacities
needed for knowledge, but since she does possess them, she is still capable of knowing many
things, including that she was shot in the head.
f. Knowledge-Destroying Epistemic Luck
Unger has successfully identified three types of harmless epistemic luck, but not all forms of
epistemic luck are benign. What is needed is an account of knowledge-undermining luck.
i. Evidential vs. Veritic Luck
Mylan Engel Jr. (1992) distinguishes two kinds of epistemic luck, evidential luck and veritic luck,
and argues that only the latter is incompatible with knowledge. Engel characterizes these two types
of luck as follows:
(EL)     A person S is evidentially lucky in believing that p in circumstances C if and only if it is
just a matter of luck that S has the evidence e for p that she does, but given her evidence e, it is
not a matter of luck that her belief that p is true in C.
(VL)    A person S is veritically lucky in believing that p in circumstances C if and only if, given
S’s evidence for p, it is just a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true in C.
To see that evidential luck is compatible with knowledge, suppose that a bank robber’s mask slips
momentarily during a holdup and the startled teller sees clearly that the robber is the bank
president. In such a situation, the teller would clearly be lucky to have the evidence she does, but
she would nevertheless know that the bank president is the villain.
Engel argues that all genuine Gettier cases involve veritic luck. In Gettier’s Case II presented above,
Smith’s belief that J or B is veritically lucky: Given Smith’s misleading evidence of Jones’s Ford-
ownership status and her total lack of evidence concerning Brown’s whereabouts, it is just a matter
of luck that Smith’s belief that J or B is true. Veritic luck with respect to p is incompatible with
knowing that p, because it undercuts the connection between S’s evidence for p and the truth of p
in a way that makes it entirely coincidental from S’s point of view that p is true.
Engel then uses the distinction between evidential and veritic luck to assess Harman cases. Jill is
not veritically lucky in believing that the President has been assassinated, for she has accurate,
reliable evidence concerning the assassination in the form of a reputable newspaper’s column, and
given this evidence, it is not a matter of luck that her belief is true. However, Jill is evidentially
lucky—she is lucky to be in the evidential situation that she is in, for had she turned on the TV and
seen the fabricated retraction, she would have been in a much worse evidential situation vis-à-vis
the President’s assassination. Lucky for her, she did not turn on the TV Like the bank teller above,
Jill is lucky to have the evidence she does, but given her evidence, she is not lucky that her belief is
true. Having argued that only veritic luck is incompatible with knowledge, Engel concludes that Jill
does know the President has been assassinated. If Engel is right, then Harman cases do not provide
examples of knowledge-undermining luck.
ii. Justification-Oriented Luck
Hamid Vahid (2001) maintains that there are two types of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck.
He agrees with Engel that veritic luck as characterized by VL is incompatible with knowledge, but
he argues, contra Engel, that there is a kind of evidential luck (which he dubs ‘justification-
oriented luck’) that is also incompatible with knowledge. Vahid contends that knowledge-
precluding justification-oriented luck is a function of how easily a person’s belief could have been
unjustified:
(JL)      A person suffers from knowledge-precluding justification-oriented luck, when she is
justified in believing that p, but given her epistemic circumstances, she could have easily been
unjustified in holding that very belief.
Vahid contends that Harman’s Assassination case provides an example of knowledge-precluding
justification-oriented luck. Jill could have easily been unjustified in believing that the President
was assassinated. Had she turned on the TV like she usually does, she would not have been
justified in holding that belief. Vahid concludes that Jill does not know that the President was
assassinated—her knowledge is destroyed by justification-oriented luck.
While JL might yield the right result in Harman’s Assassination case, it seems to yield the wrong
result with respect to the bank teller case. The teller is justified in believing that the bank president
is the robber because she just happened to look up during the brief moment when his mask had
slipped and clearly saw the robber’s face, but she could have easily been unjustified in this belief.
Had she continued to look in her cash drawer while nervously collecting the cash for the robber,
she would not have seen the robber’s face. Clearly, the teller knows that the bank president is the
robber, and yet, JL implies that she lacks such knowledge.
iii. Modal Veritic Luck
Duncan Pritchard (2003) agrees that, of these types of luck, only veritic luck is incompatible with
knowledge, but he replaces Engel’s evidence-based characterization of veritic luck with the
following modal analysis:
(MVL)  For all agents S and propositions p, the truth of S’s belief that p is veritically lucky if
and only if S’s belief that p is true in the actual world a but false in nearly all nearby possible
worlds in which S forms the belief in the same manner as in a.
MVL differs from VL in the following way: it concerns the connection between the method of belief
formation and proposition believed, rather than the connection between S’s evidence and the
proposition for which it is evidence. Pritchard argues that a safety-based neo-Moorean account,
according to which knowledge is safe true belief, is capable of eliminating veritic luck. In a
moment, we will see, contra Pritchard, that safe true belief is incapable of ruling out certain
paradigm cases of veritic luck.
g. Second-Wave Anti-Luck Epistemologies
The post-Gettier literature is rife with attempts at supplementing or amending the traditional JTB-
analysis with a satisfactory anti-luck constraint on knowledge. As surveyed in Section 1, the first
wave of proposals included adding a no-false-grounds or no-essential-false-grounds condition to
JTB, supplementing JTB with a defeasibility condition, incorporating an externalistic justification
condition in JTB, and replacing JTB with a causal theory of knowing. These and similar proposals
have fallen prey to ever-more-complicated Gettier-style examples. The general consensus is that
none of these proposals succeeds. Second-wave luck-eliminating proposals invoke counterfactual
or subjunctive constraints on knowing, principal among them: sensitivity and safety. Let us
consider each of these proposals in turn.
i. Sensitivity
S’s belief that p is sensitive to p’s truth-value if and only if S would not believe that p if p were false
(that is, if and only if S does not believe p in any of the closest ~p-worlds). To be sure, sensitive
belief does preclude veritic luck, but it does so at a steep price. First, the sensitive-true-belief
account of knowledge results in closure failure. Second, there are compelling reasons to think that
knowledge does not require sensitivity. Let’s examine each cost in turn.
Most epistemologists regard it as all but axiomatic that we can expand our knowledge by
competently deducing some currently unknown proposition u from some other known proposition
k whenever we know that k entails u. This widely-embraced idea is codified in the principle of
epistemic closure which has been formulated in each of the following ways:
(PEC1)   If S knows that p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows (or is in a position to
know) that q.
(PEC2)   If (i) S knows that p, (ii) S knows that p entails q, (iii) S competently deduces q from
her knowledge that p and that p entails q, and (iv) S comes to believe q as a result of that
competent deduction, then S knows that q.
One reason the principle of epistemic closure has enjoyed such widespread endorsement is this: If I
know that p and know that p entails q and I deduce and come to believe q from that knowledge, my
belief that q could not be false (because knowledge is factive and the truth of p entails q, together
with the truth of p, guarantees the truth of q).
The following example illustrates why sensitive-true-belief accounts of knowledge result in closure
failure. I currently believe that I am in a coffee shop [C]. My belief that C is sensitive. If I were not
in a coffee shop, I would not believe that I was, for if I were not in a coffee shop, I would be
somewhere else, for example, the grocery store or my office, and would not mistakenly think that I
was at a coffee shop. Since my belief that C is sensitive (that is, I would not believe it if it were
false), the sensitive-true-belief account of knowledge entails that I know that C. I also currently
believe that I am not at home in bed having a lifelike dream of being in a coffee shop [~H], but my
belief that ~H is not sensitive, for if I were at home in bed having a lifelike dream of being in a
coffee shop (that is, if ~H were false), I would still believe that ~H. So, according to the sensitive-
true-belief account, I do not know that ~H. Of course, my being at the coffee shop entails that I am
not at home in bed dreaming that I am in a coffee shop (that is, C ==> ~H), and I know that C ==>
~H. The sensitive-true-belief account results in closure failure because it entails that I know that C
and know that C ==> ~H, but I do not know (and cannot come to know) that ~H on that basis.
Most epistemologists regard the principle of epistemic closure to be so plausible that they find any
theory of knowledge that results in closure failure deeply problematic if not outright absurd. In
fairness to sensitivity theorists, they recognize that their theories entail closure failure and
acknowledge the antecedent implausibility of closure failure, but they argue that, despite its
counterintuitiveness, there are principled reasons for thinking that knowledge is not closed under
known implication. They grant that we have all sorts of ordinary knowledge, but insist that we do
not know and cannot know that the skeptic’s hypotheses are false. Thus, they embrace closure
failure because they think that it accurately captures our actual epistemic situation. Perhaps
sensitivity theorists are right, but given how widely accepted the principle of epistemic closure is, it
would be preferable to identify an anti-luck constraint that avoids closure failure.
The second major problem facing the sensitivity proposal, as Jonathan Vogel (1999) shows with
Hole-In-One, is that knowledge does not require sensitivity. The fourth hole at Augusta National
Golf Course where The Masters is played is a tricky 240-yard par 3, euphemistically called
“Flowering Crabapple.” In 2007, not one player shot a hole-in-one on this diabolical hole, and
there were only eleven birdies throughout four rounds of play. Right now, I know that not all
seventy-two players in this year’s Masters will shoot a hole-in-one on Flowering Crabapple in the
first round of play, but my belief to this effect is not sensitive. Were every golfer to shoot a hole-in-
one on Flowering Crabapple in Round One of the Masters in defiance of the astronomical odds
against it, I would still believe that they were not going to do so. So, sensitivity is not necessary for
knowledge.
ii. Safety
Considerations such as these have led a number of epistemologists (Sosa 1999 & 2000, Williamson
2000a & 2000b, Pritchard 2005) to replace the sensitivity condition with some sort of safety
condition. Safety comes in different strengths: S’s true belief that p is strongly safe if and only if
were S to believe that p, p would be true (that is, in all the closest worlds where S believes p, p is
true). S’s true belief that p is weakly safe if and only if S would not easily be mistaken with respect
to p (that is, in the overwhelming majority of nearby worlds where S believes that p, p is true).
Peter Murphy (2005) employs Saul Kripke’s famous counterexample to sensitivity to show that
strong safety results in closure failure. Suppose the following is true of Fake Barn County: The
landscape is peppered with barn façades, there are a few real barns in the county, some of the real
barns are red and some are blue, but all of the façades are red. Driving through Fake Barn County,
Mary is unaware that the most of the barn-looking structures are façades. She looks at a blue barn
and comes to believe that she is looking at a blue barn. Her belief is safe. In all nearby worlds
where she believes she is looking at a blue barn, she is looking at a blue barn, for there are no blue
façades. However, her belief that she is looking at a barn is not safe. There are many nearby worlds
where she believes she’s looking at a barn, but is really just looking at a façade. So, strong safety
entails that Mary knows she’s looking at a blue barn, but does not know she’s looking at a barn.
Weak safety is open to a different worry. If knowledge only requires weakly-safe justified true
belief, then a person who justifiably believes her lottery ticket will lose knows that her ticket will
lose (unless, of course, it happens to win), because in the overwhelming majority of nearby worlds,
her ticket is a loser. Many epistemologists (though not all) insist that people do not know their
lottery tickets will lose, prior to hearing the announced results. Anyone convinced that people do
not know their tickets will lose, before learning of the results, will think that weak safety is too
weak of an anti-luck constraint on knowledge.
Avram Hiller and Ram Neta (2007) convincingly argue that no safe belief condition can eliminate
all cases of veritic luck as follows: Start with a justified-but-false-and-unsafe belief like Smith's
belief that Jones owns a Ford. Next, have Smith justifiably infer a disjunction of the form J or ~G,
where Smith has no evidence whatsoever that ~G is true and where unbeknownst to Smith, ~G is
true in all nearby worlds. Let ~G = Brown will not win a Grammy. Suppose that, unbeknownst to
Smith, Brown is totally devoid of musical talent and there is no remotely close world where Brown
wins a Grammy. Then, Smith's true belief that J or ~G will be safe, but veritically lucky
nonetheless, because given Smith’s evidence, it is just a matter of luck that J or ~G is true. Since
the safe-true-belief account cannot rule out all cases of veritic luck, safe-true-belief is not sufficient
for knowledge.
Hiller and Neta’s example also shows that Pritchard’s modal account of veritic luck [MVL] is not
the correct analysis of veritic luck. Smith’s belief that J or ~G is clearly veritically lucky: Smith
bases her belief that J or ~G on her justified-but-false-and-unsafe-belief that Jones owns a Ford.
Since Smith has absolutely no knowledge or evidence of Brown’s total lack of musical talent, given
Smith’s evidence, it is just a matter of luck that her belief that J or ~G is true. But MVL entails that
Smith’s belief is not veritically lucky. According to MVL, a belief is veritically lucky if it is true in
the actual world but false in nearly all nearby worlds where Smith forms the belief in the same
manner. In Hiller and Neta’s case, Smith’s belief that J or ~G is true in the actual world, but it is
also true in all nearby worlds where it is formed in the same way (because ~G is true in all nearby
worlds). Thus, according to MVL, Smith’s belief that J or ~G is not veritically lucky. Since Smith’s
belief is veritically lucky, the MVL analysis of veritic luck is mistaken.
h. Paradox Lost
The paradox of epistemic luck dissolves once we recognize that the incompatibility thesis is false.
Not all forms of epistemic luck are incompatible with knowledge. Certainly propositional,
existential, and facultative luck are compatible with knowledge, and at least some forms of
evidential luck, like the evidential luck had by the bank teller above, are also compatible with
knowledge. There is growing consensus that veritic luck is the principal form of knowledge-
destroying luck. Since veritic luck is far from ubiquitous, the incompatibility of veritic luck with
knowledge poses no general threat to the possibility of knowledge. One can know that p whenever
it is not a matter of veritic luck that one’s justified belief that p is true.
3. Epistemic Luck and Knowing that One Knows
Although there remains broad disagreement over how exactly to formulate the condition needed to
rule out knowledge-destroying epistemic luck in a theory of knowledge, there is widespread
consensus that whatever the correct condition is, S does not need to know that that condition has
been met in order to know that p. The point can be illustrated as follows: Let the expression “S is
not Gettiered with respect to p” serve as a placeholder for whatever the correct substantive luck-
eliminating condition is. If we add this condition to the traditional justified-true-belief analysis, we
get the following schema for analyzing knowledge:
(K) S knows that p if and only if:
(i) p is true,
(ii) S believes that p,
(iii) S is justified in believing that p, and
(iv) S is not Gettiered with respect to p.
According to (K), S does not need to know that conditions (i)-(iv) are met in order to know that p.
All that (K) requires for S to know that p is that conditions (i)-(iv) be met. Since S need not know or
even believe that she is not Gettiered with respect to p in order to know that p, the possibility of
Gettier-style, knowledge-destroying, veritic luck poses no special obstacle to first-order knowledge
(where ‘first-order knowledge’ refers to knowing that p and ‘second-order knowledge’ refers to
knowing that one knows that p). As long as S is not veritically lucky with respect to p, she will
know that p, according to schema (K), provided she has a justified true belief that p.
The situation seems to be quite different when it comes to knowing that one knows, for one of the
most natural ways of coming to know that one knows that p is by knowing that one has met the
conditions required for knowing that p, and knowing the latter requires knowing that one is not
Gettiered with respect to p. The burden of the present section is to examine whether the
phenomenon of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck undermines more reflective forms of
knowledge, such as, knowing that one knows.
a. Internalism, Epistemic Luck, and the Problem of Knowing
that One Knows
Arch internalist H.A. Pritchard (1950) famously remarked: “We must recognize that whenever we
know something we either do, or at least can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it.”
Other internalists have been less sanguine about the prospects of second-order knowledge. For
example, Roderick Chisholm (1986) argues that one cannot generally know that one knows on the
grounds that one cannot generally know whether or not one’s evidence for p is defeated by Gettier
considerations. Is Chisholm right? Does the Gettier problem pose special—indeed, generally
insurmountable—obstacles to internalistically knowing that one internalistically knows that p?
Richard Feldman (1981) does not think so. He thinks that the Gettier problem poses a minor
obstacle to second-order knowledge, but one that can be easily overcome with minimal intellectual
effort. Mylan Engel Jr. (2000) disagrees. Siding with Chisholm, Engel argues that the Gettier
problem poses three distinct challenges to second-order knowledge, which, when taken together,
threaten to undermine the possibility of knowing that one knows. Michael Roth (1990) contends
that the Gettier problem poses no threat to second-order knowledge whatsoever. To assess these
competing views, it will be helpful to have a clearer idea of just what is required for internalistic
knowledge.
Post-Gettier internalists with respect to knowledge tend to work within the JTB+ tradition in that
they maintain that, in addition to true belief, knowledge requires internalistic justification as well
as some fourth externalistic anti-luck condition to rule out Gettier cases. Accordingly, by replacing
condition (iii) in schema (K) above with an explicitly internalistic justification condition, we arrive
at a schema for internalistic knowledge that most internalists would readily embrace:
(K )      S internalistically knows (knows ) that p if and only if:i i
(k1) p is true,
(k2) S believes that p,
(k3) S is internalistically justified (justified ) in believing that p, and
(k4) S is not Gettiered with respect to p.
Since (K ) provides a perfectly general account of knowledge , we can arrive at the conditions for
second-order knowledge  simply by substituting S knows  that p for p in schema (K ):
(K K ) S knows  that S knows  that p if and only if:
(kk1) S knows  that p is true,
(kk2) S believes that S knows  that p,
(kk3) S is justified  in believing that S knows  that p, and
(kk4) S is not Gettiered with respect to S knows  that p.
Chisholm doubts that (kk3) can be satisfied. To appreciate Chisholm’s worry, consider one of the
most natural and straightforward ways of satisfying condition (kk3), namely, being justified  in
believing that one has met all of the conditions required for knowing  that p:
(J K p)    S is justified  in believing that S knows  that p if and only if:
(jk1) S is justified  in believing that p,
(jk2) S is justified  in believing that S believes that p,
(jk3) S is justified  in believing that S is justified  in believing that p, and
(jk4) S is justified  in believing that S is not Gettiered with respect to p.
Since (jk1) is identical to (k3), (jk1) is satisfied whenever S knows  that p; and if we assume both
doxastic and justificational  transparency (that is, if we assume that we have introspective access to
what we believe and to our justification  for what we believe), as do many internalists, then (jk2)
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and (jk3) also pose no special problems for the would-be second-order knower.
Chisholm’s concern is with (jk4). He contends that we cannot typically tell whether or not our
evidence for p is defeated by Gettier considerations. Based on this contention, Chisholm argues as
follows: Let S be any one of us and let p be a proposition that S knows . Since S cannot tell whether
S’s evidence for p is defeated by Gettier considerations, S is not justified  in believing that S is not
Gettiered with respect to p. Hence, (jk4) is not satisfied. Since (jk4) is not satisfied, S is not
justified ​ in believing that S knows  that p, that is, (kk3) is not satisfied. Since (kk3) is a necessary
condition for knowing  that one knows  that p, S does not know ​ that S knows  that p. The gist of
Chisholm’s argument is this: Since we are not justified  in believing that we are not Gettiered with
respect to p, we do not know  that we know  that p.
Feldman disagrees. He thinks that, with minimal effort, a person who knows  that p can be
justified  in believing that she is not Gettiered with respect to p. Feldman offers two reasons for
thinking that it is relatively easy to be justified  in believing that one’s evidence for p is not
defective and thus that one is not Gettiered with respect to p. Since Feldman is primarily concerned
with determining when a person who knows  that p knows  that she knows  that p, he assumes that
S has first-order knowledge  that p when presenting his reasons.
No False Evidence
Assume that S knows  that p. S’s knowing  that p entails that S is justified  in believing that p.
Since S is justified  in believing that p, S is also justified ​ ​ in believing that all of her evidence for
p is true. Since false evidence is usually what makes one’s evidence defective, S is justified  in
believing that her justification  for p is not defective and thus that she is not Gettiered with
respect to p.
Induction
Since S has very rarely found herself to be the victim of Gettier-type situations, she is justified
in believing that such situations are very rare and atypical. Given their rarity and atypicality, S
is justified  in believing that she is not is such a situation with respect to p.
Feldman contends that No False Evidence and Induction provide S with good internalistic reasons
for believing that she is not Gettiered with respect to p. Since internalistic justification is a function
of having good internalistic reasons and S has good internalistic reasons for believing that she is
not Gettiered with respect to p, S is justified  in believing that she is not Gettiered with respect to p,
that is, (jk4) is satisfied. Since (jk1)-(jk3) are also easily satisfiable, with minimal intellectual effort,
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S can be justified  in believing that she knows  that p. Feldman concludes that satisfying (kk3)
poses no special obstacle to knowing  that one knows .
Engel contends that the Gettier problem generates three distinct challenges for the would-be
second-order knower—challenges that threaten to undermine the satisfaction of (kk1), (kk3), and
(kk4), respectively:
(1) First-order actual Gettierization: One way the Gettier problem can preclude S from knowing
that she knows  that p is by preventing S from knowing  that p. If S is Gettiered with respect to p,
then S fails to know  that p, and thus, she fails to know  that she knows  that p, since (kk1) is
unsatisfied. However, since first-order actual Gettierization precludes second-order knowledge
only when it obtains, it poses no greater threat to second-order knowledge  than it poses to first-
order knowledge .
(2) First-order possible (but non-actual) Gettierization: While actual first-order Gettierization,
when it obtains, undermines second-order knowledge  by falsifying (kk1), possible (but non-actual)
first-order Gettierization threatens to thwart one of the most natural ways of satisfying (kk3),
namely, satisfying conditions (jk1)-(jk4) of J K p. Like Chisholm, Engel’s concern here is with (jk4).
He argues that the reasons Feldman offers—No False Evidence and Induction—do not provide
adequate reasons for thinking that one is not Gettiered with respect to p. No False Evidence is not a
good reason to think that one has not been Gettiered with respect to p because, as noted in Section
1, there can be all-true-evidence Gettier cases, a point that Feldman himself demonstrated in an
earlier article (Feldman, 1974). While No False Evidence may provide S with a reason for thinking
that she is not the victim of a Gettier case involving a justified-false-belief, it provides her with no
reason to think that she is not the victim of an all-true-evidence Gettier case. The problem with
Induction is that many of the Gettier cases described in the literature are what we might call
“invisible” Gettier cases, that is, they are cases such that, were they to obtain, the Gettier victim
would never find out. They are cases that look and feel like knowledge and pass away unnoticed.
Unless Pyromaniac Pete is wearing a Geiger counter, he will never discover that it was Q-radiation
and not striking friction that caused his defective Sure Fire match to light. Unless John Lock
interrogates Lucy Lock about her morning routine, he will likely never discover that she unlocked
the doors to their house at 10:30 a.m. Unless Henry leaves the highway and investigates, he will
likely never discover that most of the barn-looking structures are façades. Considerations such as
these make it plausible to think that invisible Gettier cases are more likely to be the norm than
visible Gettier cases. The fact that S has rarely found herself to be Gettiered in the past may
provider her with a reason for thinking that visible Gettier cases are rare, but it provides her no
reason to think that invisible Gettier cases are rare, and without such a reason, she is not justified​
in believing that she is not being (invisibly) Gettiered with respect to p. Engel concludes that it is
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much more difficult to be justified  in believing that one is not Gettiered with respect to p than
Feldman alleges.
(3) Meta-Gettierization: Engel dubs second-order Gettierization “meta-Gettierization.” Just as
first-order Gettierization occurs when S’s justification for p is defective in a way that makes S
veritically lucky with respect to p, meta-Gettierization occurs when S’s justification for believing
that S knows  that p is defective in a way that makes S veritically lucky with respect to S knows
that p. By way of illustration, Engel asks us to consider Professor Cleaver, a fictitious philosophy
professor from the 1950s, who, as a pre-Gettier epistemologist, justifiably accepts the JTB-analysis
of knowledge. Since Cleaver is justified  in believing that knowledge  is justified  true belief, he is
justified  in believing that (jk1)-(jk3) are jointly sufficient for being justified  in believing that one
knows  that p. Since he is justified  in believing that (jk1)-(jk3) are jointly sufficient for being
justified  in believing that one knows  that p, he is justified  in believing that he knows  that p
provided that he is justified  in believing that he has justified -true-belief that p. Let p be a
proposition that Cleaver knows . If he believes that he knows  that p, and if he is justified  in
believing that he knows  that p on the basis of his justified -but-false-belief that knowledge  is
justified  true belief, together with his justified -true-belief that he has a justified -true-belief that p,
then Cleaver will have a justified -true-belief that he knows  that p, which falls short of knowledge
because his justification  essentially depends on his justified -but-false-belief that knowledge  is
justified  true belief. The point generalizes. Anytime that Cleaver comes to believe that he knows
that p on the basis of his justified -but-false-belief that the JTB-analysis is correct, he will
automatically be meta-Gettierized and will, thus, fail to know  that he knows  that p. Engel then
argues that whether those of us who have grown up in the post-Gettier enlightenment can avoid
Cleaver’s fate depends on whether any of us justifiedly ​  believes a true epistemology. Since no
epistemology to date is immune to objection, Engel thinks it doubtful that any of us holds a true
epistemology (no matter how well justified  we might be in our preferred epistemology). Given how
likely it is that we are operating with a false epistemology, Engel contends that whenever we come
to believe that we know  that p on the basis of our preferred epistemology, we are almost certain to
become yet another meta-Gettier casualty, for we are almost certain to have based our belief that
we ​​know  that p on a justified  false belief about the requirements for knowledge .
Roth contends that the debate over whether the Gettier problem poses a major or minor obstacle to
second-order knowledge  is entirely misguided. He argues that Gettier considerations pose no
obstacle to second-order knowledge  whatsoever. His argument is rooted in what he calls the
Fallibilist Assumption Governing Empirical Knowledge:
(FA)    For every proposition of the form Kp (where p is empirical and K is the knowledge
operator), there are certain contingencies such that: (i) their obtaining is physically possible,
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(ii) were they to obtain, Kp would be false, and (iii) S is completely justified in disregarding any
of these contingencies in considering whether she has adequate justification for p.
Roth contends that there are two types of Kp-falsifying contingencies. “Type I contingencies”
satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of (FA). “Type II contingencies” satisfy conditions (i) and (ii),
but not (iii). Roth asks us to imagine a great dividing wall – The Wall of Fallibilism – that separates
the Type I contingencies from the Type II contingencies. As Roth envisions it, the Wall of
Fallibilism plays an important role in protecting us from knowledge-destroying epistemic luck. If,
given S’s evidence for p in circumstances C, it is simply a matter of luck that p is true in C, then S
does not know that p in C. To ensure that it is not just a matter of veritic luck that S’s belief that p is
true (in C), S must be suitably protected from error with respect to p (in C). According to Roth, the
Wall protects us from the slings and arrows of outrageous Type I error possibilities by cordoning us
off from these remote properly ignorable Kp-falsifying contingencies. We do not need evidence
that these contingencies do not obtain in order to know  that p. Being safely outside the Wall, we do
not need to take them into account in our epistemic reflections at all. Their sheer remoteness and
improbability protects us from having to worry about them. As long as they do not actually obtain,
these contingencies provide no obstacle to knowledge  whatsoever. But the Wall does not provide
us with all the protection from luck and error that we need in order to possess knowledge . We
must also be protected from error with respect to those Type II contingencies that are inside the
Wall. These p-falsifying contingencies are genuinely in doubt. Were any of these contingencies to
obtain, p would be false, and as a result, so too would Kp. To protect us from these realistic non-
ignorable ~p-possibilities, we need justification that precludes them. The picture of fallible
knowledge  that emerges is this:
S knows  that p only if (i) S’s justification  is strong enough to rule out all of the relevant Type
II ~p-possibilities inside the Wall and (ii) none of the Type I contingencies outside the Wall
obtain.
Roth thinks that the Wall metaphor explains why Gettier considerations pose no obstacle to
second-order knowledge . Gettier considerations are paradigm cases of Type I contingencies. We
do not need to know  or even believe that Type I contingencies do not obtain in order to know  that
p. As long as no Type I contingencies obtain, S will know  that p provided she satisfies the other
conditions required for knowing  that p. Like Type I contingencies generally, Gettier considerations
only undermine knowledge  when they obtain. We do not need to know  or even believe that no
Gettier circumstances obtain in order to know  that p. As long as they do not obtain, we will know
that p provided we have met the other conditions required for knowing  that p. Since Gettier
contingencies are outside the Wall, Roth contends that it is perfectly proper to ignore them when
trying to determine whether one knows  that p.
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Roth’s reason for thinking that Gettier contingencies pose no obstacle to knowing  that one knows
is that he thinks that Gettier possibilities are properly ignorable Type I contingencies that lie safely
outside the Wall. The problem with Roth’s argument is that the Wall’s location is not fixed. As Roth
himself admits, where the Wall is situated is relativized to a particular attempt to acquire
knowledge  of a particular proposition. Which contingencies are outside the Wall and which are
not, that is, which contingencies are properly ignorable and which are not, is a function of the
proposition one is attempting to come to know  and the circumstances under which one is trying to
come to know  it. While Gettier contingencies vis-à-vis p are clearly properly ignorable where
coming to know  that p is concerned, they are not properly-ignorable when it comes to knowing
that Kp. To the contrary, it seems that Kp-destroying Gettier contingencies are precisely the kind of
contingencies that one needs to be able to rule out in order to know that one knows that p. Gettier
contingencies are not p-falsifying contingencies (for p is true in Gettier situations), but they are
Kp-falsifying contingencies. As such, they are Type I contingencies when it comes to knowing  that
p, but Type II contingencies when it comes to knowing  that one knows  that p. In effect, the Wall
moves outward where second-order knowledge  is concerned. The very same Gettier contingencies
that are outside the p-Wall are inside the Kp-Wall. Being inside the Kp-Wall, they are not properly
ignorable when it comes to knowing  that Kp. To know  that one knows  that p, one must know
that no Gettier Kp-falsifying contingencies obtain. It is precisely because we cannot generally
know  that no Gettier contingencies obtain that Chisholm and Engel contend that second-order
knowledge  is difficult to attain.
b. Epistemic Luck and Reflective Knowledge
Even if veritic luck poses no special problem for reflectively knowing that one knows, Duncan
Pritchard contends that another more worrisome kind of epistemic luck does preclude such
knowledge. Reflective epistemic luck arises when, from the agent’s reflective position, it is just a
matter of luck that her belief is true. More precisely:
MRL   For all S and p, the truth of S’s belief that p is reflectively lucky if and only if S’s belief
that p is true in the actual world but, in nearly all nearby possible worlds consistent with what
S is able to know by reflection alone, were S to believe p, p would be false.
When it comes to modal reflective luck, the epistemically relevant possible worlds are ordered in a
non-standard way solely in terms of what the agent is able to know on the basis of her subjective
internal reflections alone. Accordingly, any possible world consistent with S’s having that same
internally accessible evidence that she has in the actual world will be reflectively equally close to
the actual world. Since, by hypothesis, S would have exactly the same internally accessible evidence
in a demon world or a BIV-world that she has in the actual world, these worlds are just as close,
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reflectively, to the actual world as is the world where everything is just as it seems. Since our
ordinary commonsense perceptual beliefs are false in a wide variety of these reflectively equally
close skeptical-scenario possible worlds, Pritchard maintains that MRL entails that our ordinary
commonsense perceptual beliefs—if true in the actual world—are reflectively lucky. [Whether MRL
actually entails that all of our true commonsense perceptual beliefs are reflectively lucky is by no
means obvious. The fact that our commonsense beliefs are false in malevolent demon and BIV
worlds does not show that these beliefs are false in nearly all reflectively equally close possible
worlds. After all, for every malevolent demon world where we are systematically deceived, there is
a corresponding benevolent demon world that is just as close, reflectively, in which the benevolent
demon sees to it that all of our commonsense beliefs are true.]
Pritchard thinks that reflective luck is not incompatible with ordinary knowledge (he thinks only
veritic luck is), but he insists that reflective luck is incompatible with a much-desired internalistic
kind of robust reflective knowledge. Pritchard contends that skeptical challenges force us to
confront the fundamental human epistemic predicament, to wit, that we cannot know, on the basis
of reflection alone, that the skeptic’s radical hypotheses are false. For example, he thinks that we
cannot know, by reflection alone, that we are not bodiless brains being kept alive in vats of nutrient
being deceived into thinking we have hands.
If Pritchard is right that we lack reflective knowledge that the skeptic’s hypotheses are false, then
those who think that reflective knowledge is closed under known entailment face an even greater
skeptical threat. According to the principle of epistemic closure (PEC1): If S knows that p and also
knows that p entails q, then S either knows or is in a position to know that q. Since we know that
having hands entails not being a deceived bodiless brain in a vat, if we cannot have reflective
knowledge that we are not deceived bodiless brains in vats, then given PEC1, we cannot have
reflective knowledge that we have hands. The point can, of course, be generalized. Since radical
skeptical hypotheses are incompatible with virtually all of the ordinary propositions we routinely
take ourselves to know, if we lack reflective knowledge that radical skeptical hypotheses are false,
then we lack reflective knowledge of the most mundane of ordinary propositions.
Pritchard contends that skeptical challenges force us to recognize the reflectively lucky nature of
our anti-skeptical beliefs and that this, in turn, explains the enduring epistemic angst that skeptical
hypotheses engender. Pritchard argues that the ineliminability of reflective luck shows that we not
only lack reflective knowledge that the skeptic’s hypotheses are false, we also lack reflective
knowledge that our ordinary commonsense beliefs are true. If Pritchard is right, we may, indeed,
possess a great deal of ordinary knowledge, but the ineliminability of reflective luck will forever
preclude us from reflectively being able to tell that we do.
4. Conclusion
Reflecting on the nature and scope of epistemic luck gives us deeper insight into the nature and
scope of knowledge. Gettier cases demonstrate that fallible justification is not capable of ruling out
all forms of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck and that thus knowledge requires more than
justified true belief. Just what anti-luck condition must be added justified true belief to arrive at an
adequate analysis of knowledge remains an open question.
Recognizing which forms of epistemic luck are incompatible with knowledge and which are not
puts us one step closer to identifying the correct luck-eliminating condition. It is now generally
acknowledged that veritic luck is incompatible with knowledge. Whether other forms of epistemic
luck, such as, justification-oriented luck, are incompatible with knowledge is a question that
deserves more attention. At a minimum, any adequate theory of knowledge must be capable of
ruling out all cases of veritic luck and to date no theory has been able to do so.
The possibility of knowledge-destroying veritic luck poses no special skeptical threat where first-
order knowledge is concerned. As long as a person is not veritically lucky with respect to p, she will
know that p, provided she has met the other conditions required for knowledge. The situation
appears to be different where second-order knowledge is concerned. While there is no consensus to
date as to how serious an obstacle the Gettier problem poses for second-order knowledge, it poses
enough of an obstacle to such knowledge to render implausible the once widely held KK-thesis
according to which knowing entails knowing that one knows.
Veritic luck is not the only form of epistemic luck that threatens more reflective forms of
knowledge. Reflective luck also threatens to undermine the possibility of reflectively knowing that
one knows. Our apparent inability to know, on the basis of reflection alone, that the skeptic’s
radical hypotheses are false, together with the principle of  epistemic closure, threatens to
undermine the possibility of reflective knowledge altogether.
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